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Resumo
Objetivos: Validar e adaptar para português europeu um 
conjunto de dilemas morais amplamente utilizado, que poderá 
ser aplicado para avaliar a tomada de decisão moral. Além 
disso, comparou-se a formulação clássica dos dilemas com 
uma versão alternativa, que incluía uma questão mais focada 
na moralidade. Finalmente, testou-se uma versão reduzida dos 
cenários morais. 
Métodos: A versão portuguesa dos dilemas morais foi testada 
em 53 participantes de várias regiões de Portugal, e a versão 
alternativa foi testada em 41 sujeitos. Finalmente, a versão 
reduzida dos dilemas morais foi testada numa amostra de 137 
participantes. 
Resultados: Não houve diferenças significativas entre a versão 
portuguesa e a inglesa. A pergunta “É moralmente aceitável...?” 
evocou menos respostas utilitárias que a versão original, 
embora não tenham sido obtidas diferenças significativas. 
A versão portuguesa original, a alternativa e a reduzida 
evidenciaram o mesmo padrão de respostas, sugerindo que os 
elementos fundamentais para a tomada de decisão moral estão 
preservados.
Conclusões: Encontramos evidências para a validade intercultural 
dos dilemas morais. No entanto, o foco moral colocado na questão 
final pode afetar os juízos utilitários/deontológicos. 
Descritores: Emoção, cognição, psiquiatria forense, estudos de 
validação, psicometria.
Abstract
Objective: To adapt and validate a widely used set of moral 
dilemmas to European Portuguese, which can be applied to 
assess decision-making. Moreover, the classical formulation of 
the dilemmas was compared with a more focused moral probe. 
Finally, a shorter version of the moral scenarios was tested.
Methods: The Portuguese version of the set of moral dilemmas 
was tested in 53 individuals from several regions of Portugal. 
In a second study, an alternative way of questioning on moral 
dilemmas was tested in 41 participants. Finally, the shorter 
version of the moral dilemmas was tested in 137 individuals.
Results: Results evidenced no significant differences between 
English and Portuguese versions. Also, asking whether actions 
are “morally acceptable” elicited less utilitarian responses than 
the original question, although without reaching statistical 
significance. Finally, all tested versions of moral dilemmas 
exhibited the same pattern of responses, suggesting that the 
fundamental elements to the moral decision-making were 
preserved.
Conclusions: We found evidence of cross-cultural validity 
for moral dilemmas. However, the moral focus might affect 
utilitarian/deontological judgments. 
Keywords: Cognition, emotion, forensic psychiatry, validation 
studies, psychometric.
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Introduction
Moral dilemmas have become a standard 
methodology to assess and understand human moral 
psychology.1,2 Dilemmas are fictional stories describing 
two conflicting options. As participants are forced 
to choose one of these options, the dilemmas allow 
investigating to which reason precedence is given, and 
which features are crucial for moral decisions.2,3
Studying moral decision-making through moral 
dilemmas also allows the inclusion of many variables 
in their formulation, enabling a more holistic approach 
and ecological validity under a higher level of 
experimental control.2 Additionally, moral dilemmas 
offer a valuable tool to study which factors trigger the 
psychological foundations of human moral cognition, 
allowing conclusions about real-life moral decision-
making.1,2,4
Kohlberg used moral dilemmas in his studies about the 
moral reasoning development. Following his work, moral 
psychology was dominated by theories that emphasized 
the role of reasoning and “higher cognition” in moral 
judgment.5,6 Greene et al. proposed a theory that links 
utilitarian moral judgment with controlled cognitive 
processes, and non-utilitarian (deontological) moral 
judgment with automatic emotional responses.1,7,8 To 
test this theory, Greene et al. proposed a set of classical 
moral dilemmas that distinguish between “personal” 
and “impersonal” scenarios.1,7,9 In each scenario, the 
participant must decide whether it is appropriate or 
not to commit some harm or moral violation to achieve 
a specific favorable outcome. The personal scenarios 
involve direct physical contact, as in the case of the 
footbridge dilemma10: 
A trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next 
to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in 
between the oncoming trolley and the five people. The only 
way to save the five people is pushing this stranger off the 
bridge. Ought you to push this stranger to his death, to stop 
the trolley from hitting five people and save them?
In turn, the impersonal scenarios comprise more 
indirect rule violations,11 as in the case of the trolley 
dilemma10: 
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed 
if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save 
them is pulling a switch that will turn the trolley onto an 
alternate set of tracks, where it will kill one person instead of 
five. Ought one to divert the trolley, preventing it from hitting 
five people, to save them at the expense of one person?
The outcome of these dilemmas is the same: 
five individuals saved by sacrificing one. However, 
participants typically consent to pull the switch but 
decline to push the stranger. The decision to commit the 
harm to maximize positive consequences is considered 
a “utilitarian” response. In contrast, a “deontological” 
response would be the omission of any harmful 
action, based on the belief that certain duties must be 
respected.8
Several studies demonstrated a noticeable pattern of 
utilitarian moral judgment in populations with deficits in 
socioemotional processing, which substantiate the utility 
of using formal instruments to assess moral judgment. 
For instance, patients with lesions in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and patients with frontotemporal 
dementia demonstrated a more utilitarian judgment.11-14 
Adults with psychopathy, who show pronounced deficits 
in emotional processing and inhibitory control, also 
exhibited severe disruption of moral behavior, and 
generally failed to distinguish moral from conventional 
violations.15 They had increased utilitarian judgment 
and diminished empathic concern.16,17
However, results obtained with this methodological 
approach have been heterogeneous, and the lack of 
consensus regarding their interpretation is mainly 
due to the lack of validation of moral dilemmas sets.2 
Research with this set of moral dilemmas has been 
lacking of a thorough psychometric evaluation and, to 
the best of our knowledge, only one previous study 
reported measures of internal consistency, but only 
for high-conflict personal dilemmas.18 In line with 
this scenario, this study presents results of three 
experiments conducted to validate the set of moral 
dilemmas proposed by Greene et al., as well as to 
test methodological improvements.1 Specifically, the 
first experiment provides a cross-cultural validation 
of moral scenarios, by adapting them to European 
Portuguese and further assessing their reliability 
and internal consistency. In the second experiment, 
following Greene’s personal suggestion, the original 
question (“Is it appropriate...?”) was replaced with the 
question “Is it morally acceptable...?,” with the aim of 
increasing the focus on moral judgment, by eliciting 
more reflection about the right and wrong according 
to a moral standpoint. In the third experiment, a 
shorter version of each scenario was developed by 
reducing the number of words without changing the 
meaning of the text. This reduction aimed to decrease 
the cognitive load of each scenario, by reducing the 
details of the fictional stories. Importantly, the internal 
consistency of the adapted and shortened versions of 
moral dilemmas is reported in the three experiments.
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Experiment 1 – Adaptation and validation 
of moral dilemmas to European 
Portuguese
Greene et al. introduced this set of moral dilemmas 
in cognitive neuroscience as an attempt to deepen 
our understanding of the role of emotion in moral 
judgment.1,3 However, the results obtained with this 
methodological approach have been heterogeneous, and 
there is a lack of consensus regarding how to interpret 
them. Moreover, there is also a lack of cross-validation, 
which precludes the understanding of cultural influences 
on the pattern of responses. 
Although cultural differences in moral decisions are 
a major theme in social psychology, the effect of culture 
in moral psychology is still far from being understood, 
since research in this field is largely restricted to 
English-speaking populations.19 However, even though 
some moral features are universal (e.g., “it is wrong 
to produce harm without any kind of justification”), 
morality highly varies across cultures, depending 
on specific norms, practices or values.19 According 
to Kohlberg & Candee, sociocultural context guides 
people’s moral evaluation and decision-making.20 Two 
previous studies reported differences in the acceptance 
of harm between Colombian and Spanish participants, 
as well as in the neural correlates underlying moral 
decision-making between Chinese and Western 
participants.21,22 These findings reinforce that morality 
cannot be completely understood without considering 
sociocultural factors, supporting the need for cross-
cultural studies in moral dilemmas.
In line with these results, the first experiment of 
the present study aimed to cross-culturally validate the 
moral dilemmas proposed by Greene et al., adapting 
each scenario to European Portuguese. Moreover, 
we aim to provide Portuguese normative values and 
assess the reliability and internal consistency of this 
instrument.
Methods
Participants
This study was approved by the local research ethics 
committee, and all participants gave informed consent. 
Inclusion criteria were being older than 18 years and 
having Portuguese nationality and fluency. 
The Portuguese version of the moral dilemmas was 
tested with 53 individuals (39 women), recruited via 
convenience sampling, following advertisement of the 
study on social networks. This form of dissemination 
resulted in a sample of participants from the north 
(81%), center (8%) and south (2%) of Portugal. 
Moreover, one participant (2%) was from the Azores, 
and three participants (6%) did not report their location 
of residence. Participants were between 18 and 52 
years old (mean [M] = 23.6, standard deviation [SD] 
= 7.27) and reported 12 to 19 years of education (M = 
14.9, SD = 2.66). 
Two participants were excluded from the initial 
sample (n = 58) for having other nationalities, and three 
were excluded for being detected as outliers (see Data 
analysis below for information on outlier detection).
Materials
The set of moral dilemmas is composed of 40 
scenarios, divided into 12 high-conflict personal 
scenarios (that elicited lower rates of agreement), 
nine low-conflict personal scenarios (that elicited near-
perfect agreement) and 19 impersonal scenarios.1,13 
Each scenario asks whether it is appropriate to commit 
a harm or transgression to achieve a more favorable 
outcome. 
Translation and adaptation
After securing permission with the original author, the 
translation of the dilemmas to Portuguese was conducted 
according to procedures intended to maximize semantic 
(i.e., content and phrasing of the items) and normative 
equivalence (i.e., conformity between the instrument 
and the cultural rules of the target culture) between 
both versions.23 This process comprised the following 
stages: 1) translation – two independent translations 
were carried out and reviewed to reach a consensual 
version, which was reviewed by a third researcher 
to optimize the translation; 2) pilot-administration 
with thinking out loud – the consensual version was 
administered to six participants, who discussed their 
understanding of each item and gave suggestions to 
improve the text, their answers, and the reasoning (as 
a result, 11 items were clarified); 3) back-translation 
 – the Portuguese version was back-translated to English 
by a fourth researcher; 4) comparison with the original 
version – the back-translated version was approved by 
the original author. All researchers involved in translation 
and back-translation were proficient in both languages 
and experienced in moral judgment and social cognition 
research fields.24 The final version of the Portuguese 
set of the moral dilemmas is available as Online-Only 
Supplementary Material.
Procedures
The Portuguese moral dilemmas were presented 
in random order to all participants in an online 
questionnaire (Qualtrics, 2016, Provo, UT, USA). The 
participants read and responded at their own pace, 
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choosing the option “yes” or “no” to the question “Is 
it appropriate...?.” After answering, the next scenario 
was displayed. All participants answered to all the 
dilemmas, as responding was mandatory to move to 
the next question.
Data analysis
The internal consistency of each category of 
dilemmas (high- and low-conflict personal dilemmas 
and impersonal dilemmas) was assessed using the 
Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (KR20),25 which is 
a special case of Cronbach’s alpha used for binary 
items. The results obtained with our data collection 
were compared to the results obtained in the original 
study. Statistically significant differences between the 
percentage of utilitarian responses to the Portuguese 
and the original versions were independently assessed 
for each category of dilemmas using the Mann-Whitney 
U test, since the normality (Shapiro-Wilk’s test) and 
homogeneity of variances (Levene’s test) assumptions 
were not met. The percentage of utilitarian responses 
for both versions was also compared by dilemma, using 
the z-test for proportions. The Bonferroni correction was 
applied to control for multiple comparisons, to retain 
a family-wise statistical significance level of p < 0.05. 
Participants who selected a category that occurred with 
less than 5% of relative frequency were excluded as 
categorical outliers (n = 3) before computing KR20 
and performing comparisons. All statistical tests were 
performed using Statistica version 13.0.
Results
The internal consistency was good for high-conflict 
personal dilemmas (ρ = 0.84), poor for impersonal 
dilemmas (ρ = 0.53), and unacceptable for low-conflict 
personal dilemmas (ρ = 0.47).
Nevertheless, the comparison between Portuguese 
and original percentages of utilitarian responses did 
not show significant differences for any category of 
moral dilemmas (Table 1). Additionally, no significant 
differences were found when the two versions were 
compared by dilemma.
Table 1 - Percentage of utilitarian responses to the Portuguese (original and modified questions)  
and original versions1 of the moral dilemmas
Dilemma 
High-conflict  
personal dilemmas
Dilemma
Low-conflict  
personal dilemmas
Dilemma
Impersonal dilemmas
Original Portuguese
Modified 
question Original Portuguese
Modified 
question Original Portuguese
Modified 
question
Crying baby 60 38 12 Architect 1 4 5 Donation 62 70 66
Euthanasia 63 77 61 Country road 3 2 0 Environmental policy A1 75 72 80
Footbridge 21 38 22 Plane crash 2 25 5 Environmental policy A2 84 89 80
Lawrence of Arabia 82 68 51 Grandson 1 0 2 Environmental policy B1 24 15 17
Modified bomb 90 75 78 Hard times 9 2 0 Environmental policy B2 25 11 24
Modified lifeboat 71 74 49 Hired rapist 4 0 0 Eyes 3 0 7
Modified safari 22 60 34 Infanticide 5 0 0 Five-for-seven trolley 5 2 24
Sacrifice 51 26 17 Smother for dollars 7 9 2 Guarded speedboat 91 85 93
Sophie’s choice 62 38 29 Transplant 12 4 0 Illegal lunch 9 4 10
Submarine 91 81 66 Lost wallet 16 17 17
Vaccine test 79 64 46 Resume 9 11 10
Vitamins 35 32 22 Sculpture 96 92 95
Speedboat 99 87 90
Standard trolley 82 68 49
Standard fumes 76 64 44
Stock tip 12 11 17
Taxes 24 23 27
Three-for-seven fumes 10 4 12
Vaccine policy 85 85 85
Mean (SD) 60.6
(24.3)
56.0
(20.1)
40.6
(21.1)
4.89 
(3.79)
5.11
(8.00)
1.56
(2.13)
46.7
(37.0)
42.6
(36.6)
44.6
(33.2)
Mann-Whitney 
U test
64.5 42.0 30.5 29.5 161.0 204.5
p 0.67 0.089 0.39 0.34 0.58 0.49
SD = standard deviation.
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Experiment 2 – “Is it appropriate...?” vs. 
“Is it morally acceptable...?”
The formulation of the final question of moral 
dilemmas, designed to elicit moral judgment, has given 
rise to some controversy, since the type of question 
influences the participant’s moral decision.2,26,27 For 
instance, in a study that used four question formats 
(wrong, inappropriate, forbidden, and blameworthy), 
participants judged moral transgressions more severely 
when the words “wrong” or “inappropriate” were part of 
the formulation.28 Similarly, distinct response patterns 
were found with the questions “Is it wrong to...?” and 
“Would you...?.” The later formulation resulted in faster 
reaction times in moral than in non-moral scenarios, 
while the question “Is it wrong to...?” did not result in 
differences between both conditions.29
In this set of moral dilemmas, participants are 
typically questioned with an appropriate–inappropriate 
dichotomy.1 However, in some studies, participants 
may decide instead if they would choose to carry out 
the depicted action in a yes–no dichotomy, a decision 
that may be preceded by another dichotomous question 
asking whether the action is right or wrong.11,29 Another 
alternative is to ask the participants to indicate their 
judgment in a permissible–forbidden scale.30 However, it 
is not the same to ask whether an action is permissible 
or appropriate.3 While the first term relates to the legal 
permissibility of the action, “appropriate” suggests 
whether the participant finds the action obligatory to the 
situation. Similarly, the right–wrong dichotomy hints the 
legal permissibility of the action, while the “would you...?” 
question does not give information about the judgment 
of the action (participants could decide to do what they 
take to be wrong).3 Moreover, the typical formulation 
(“appropriate”) is ambiguous and may be understood as 
related to conventional instead moral rules.29
In line with these findings, the formulation of the 
question should be a matter of research, and this 
experiment provides a further test of the influence 
of question formulation on moral decision-making. 
Different questions may entail differential moral 
judgments, which would interfere with the development 
of a unified theory of moral judgment.3
Considering that dilemmas are used to test 
moral judgment, with our modification (“Is it morally 
acceptable” instead of “Is it appropriate”) we intend 
to make the question less ambiguous and increase the 
focus on moral judgment, by eliciting more reflection 
about right and wrong according to a moral standpoint. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
tests this type of formulation, since previous studies 
have only used this probe in a Likert scale (e.g., “to 
what extent is the action morally acceptable?”), but 
not in a dichotomy.30 However, dichotomous questions 
are typically preferred, since they force participants to 
choose one of the options, allowing to investigate to 
which reason precedence is given in moral decisions. 
We hypothesized that the percentage of utilitarian 
responses would decrease with the increasing focus 
on moral decision-making, which may raise controlled 
cognitive processes.
Methods
Participants
We tested an alternative way of questioning on moral 
dilemmas in 41 participants (22 women), aged 19 to 65 
years (M = 32.0 years, SD = 10.0) and with 9 to 22 
years of education (M = 16.4 years, SD = 3.50). All 
participants gave informed consent and were recruited 
by e-mail, using a convenience sampling approach. 
This form of recruitment was selected to ensure that 
participants who responded to this version of moral 
dilemmas would not respond to the two alternative 
forms (Experiments 1 and 3) that were going on 
simultaneously. Participants were recruited from the 
north (39%), center (56%) and south (5%) of Portugal. 
One participant with another nationality was previously 
excluded from the sample. 
Procedures
The procedure was replicated from Experiment 1, 
changing the way of questioning in the Portuguese version 
of the moral dilemmas to “Is it morally acceptable...?,” 
rather than the original “Is it appropriate...?.” This 
modification may alter how participants approach the 
task and makes it more appropriate for the aim of the 
moral dilemmas.31 Inter-method reliability was tested by 
assessing the differences in the percentage of utilitarian 
responses obtained in Experiment 1.
Results
Internal consistency, measured by the KR20 test, 
was good for high-conflict personal dilemmas (ρ = 
0.86), poor for impersonal dilemmas (ρ = 0.50), and 
unacceptable for low-conflict personal dilemmas (ρ = 
0.47).
The percentages of utilitarian responses to the 
Portuguese version of moral dilemmas, with the original 
and modified questions, are presented in Table 1. The 
comparison between the two ways of questioning did 
not evidence statistical significance for any category of 
moral dilemmas. 
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Experiment 3 – Validation of a shorter 
version of the moral dilemmas
This set of moral dilemmas has been repeatedly 
used in moral judgment research, both in healthy 
and in pathological populations, to understand the 
underpinnings of morality and how specific conditions 
affect moral judgment. As stated in a recent review, 
moral dilemmas imply a lot of reading, and keeping 
them as short as possible prevents the participants 
from getting tired. Moreover, the cognitive load of each 
scenario can be decreased by reducing the details of 
the fictional stories.3
According to this evidence, a shorter version of 
each scenario was developed by reducing the number 
of words. The major challenge of this experiment was 
to keep the meaning of the text intact, as word framing 
is known to affect decision-making.32 Under certain 
circumstances, participants violate the principle of 
invariance, which postulates that moral choices must 
depend on the situation and not on the description. 
For instance, participants have different preferences 
over equivalent situations because of the way they are 
described, preferring a situation in which half of the 
population is saved to one in which half the population 
dies in an epidemy.3
Thereby, the aim of the present experiment was 
to create and validate a shorter version of this set of 
moral dilemmas, without changing the meaning of each 
scenario. We hypothesized that both versions would 
reach the same pattern of responses, evidencing a 
preserved focus on moral judgment despite a reduction 
in cognitive demands of each dilemma. This shorter 
version may be particularly useful to investigate moral 
judgments in clinical populations or for use with research 
techniques that require fast events, such as event-
related designs for studies with electroencephalography 
(EEG) or functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI).
Methods
Participants
This experiment included a sample of 137 individuals 
(114 women), aged 18 to 62 years (M = 22.5 years, 
SD = 7.16) and with 9 to 22 years of education (M = 
14.2 years, SD = 2.53). All participants gave electronic 
informed consent and were recruited by an e-mail sent 
to all students of the local university. Participants were 
from the north (83%) and center (9%) of mainland 
Portugal, as well as from the Azores (1%) and Madeira 
(1%). Eight participants (6%) did not report their 
location of residence.
Shorter version of moral dilemmas
The dilemmas tested in the Experiment 2 (Portuguese 
version of moral dilemmas with the modified question) 
were abbreviated by shortening the story of each 
scenario. To the reduction process, two researchers 
abbreviated each dilemma (eliminating the information 
considered unessential to moral judgment), and a final 
consensual version was developed. Subsequently, both 
the long and the short versions of the dilemmas were 
administered, in a balanced order, to eight participants, 
who discussed their understanding of both versions. 
Participants consensually reported that the shorter 
version was easier to answer, due to fewer details to 
memorize. On average, each scenario was reduced in 
29.7% of total words (SD = 7.37, range: 16.5-45.8%). 
The shorter version of the moral dilemmas is also 
available as Online-Only Supplementary Material.
Procedures
Since the aim of the current experiment was to test 
the convergent validity of the short version of moral 
dilemmas, in order to guarantee that the moral content 
of each scenario was preserved despite the length 
reduction, a within-subjects design was adopted. This 
design is recommended to test convergent validity, since 
it allows to test the correlation of responses between 
both measures while reducing individual variability.33,34 
Thus, the long and short dilemmas were presented in 
random order in an online questionnaire (LimeSurvey 
2.14, LimeSurvey Project Hamburg, Germany), to 
prevent carryover effects. Participants read and 
responded at their own pace, choosing the option yes 
or no to the question “Is it morally acceptable to...?.” 
After answering, the next scenario was displayed. All 
participants answered to all the dilemmas, as responding 
was mandatory to move to the next question. Data 
analysis was replicated from the previous experiments, 
but the phi coefficient, a measure of correlation for 
two binary variables, was calculated between the two 
versions.35 
Results
Internal consistency was equivalent for both versions 
of dilemmas: good for high-conflict personal dilemmas 
(long and short versions: ρ = 0.85), and unacceptable 
for impersonal (long version: ρ = 0.40; short version: 
ρ = 0.41) and low-conflict personal dilemmas (long 
version: ρ = 0.29; short version: ρ = 0.28). 
No significant differences were found between the 
utilitarian responses to both versions of moral dilemmas 
(Table 2), and the phi coefficient revealed robust 
associations in every case (rφ = 0.97 to high-conflict 
personal dilemmas; rφ = 0.85 to impersonal dilemmas; 
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rφ = 0.85 to low-conflict personal dilemmas). Moreover, 
significant differences were not found when the two 
versions were compared by dilemma (Table 2).
Discussion
Moral dilemmas have been extensively studied 
in the field of moral psychology, and their use has 
much to contribute to our understanding of moral 
decision-making.1,3 However, methodological critiques 
highlight the need for research on this instrument, 
including psychometric evaluation, to enable an 
accurate interpretation of the results.3 Moreover, it 
is important to test the dilemmas across different 
countries, languages, and cultures, to understand the 
effects of culture on moral judgment. In line with these 
issues, the aim of the first study was to validate moral 
dilemmas to European Portuguese and to assess its 
reliability in a sample of Portuguese adults.1 Moreover, 
two experimental improvements were also tested.
The results of Experiment 1 evidenced that the 
Portuguese version of the dilemmas is quite satisfactory, 
and the comparison of our results with the ones from 
the original version did not show significant differences 
in the percentage of utilitarian responses. This lack of 
differences confirms the results of a previous cross-
cultural validation of a Spanish version of the same 
instrument.35 This evidence supports the cross-cultural 
validity of the dilemmas despite cultural differences 
between both countries (i.e., more individualistic vs. 
more communitarian) and may suggest the existence of 
universal moral judgments, independent of cultural or 
educational background.1,35 However, as these findings 
contrast with results of other cross-cultural validations, 
further studies assessing the effects of each culture on 
moral judgment are needed.17,19
The results obtained with the internal consistency 
assessment of the Portuguese set was good for high-
conflict personal dilemmas (ρ = 0.84), suggesting 
that this type of stimuli is reliable to assess moral 
judgment in Portuguese individuals. Despite a lack of 
Table 2 - Percentage of utilitarian responses to the Portuguese long and short versions of moral dilemmas
Dilemma 
High-conflict  
personal dilemmas
Dilemma
Low-conflict  
personal dilemmas
Dilemma
Impersonal 
dilemmas
Short Long Short Long Short Long
Crying baby 28 25 Architect 1 1 Donation 64 64
Euthanasia 72 74 Country road 0 1 Environmental policy A1 82 82
Footbridge 20 22 Plane crash 20 18 Environmental policy A2 81 80
Lawrence of Arabia 71 75 Grandson 3 0 Environmental policy B1 15 14
Modified bomb 82 80 Hard times 1 1 Environmental policy B2 16 18
Modified lifeboat 65 68 Hired rapist 0 0 Eyes 2 3
Modified safari 65 65 Infanticide 1 1 Five-for-seven trolley 12 8
Sacrifice 26 29 Smother for dollars 1 1 Guarded speedboat 93 94
Sophie’s choice 36 35 Transplant 5 5 Illegal lunch 8 8
Submarine 78 79 Lost wallet 13 12
Vaccine test 66 67 Resume 8 5
Vitamins 22 20 Sculpture 99 99
Speedboat 96 96
Standard trolley 67 72
Standard fumes 69 69
Stock tip 15 15
Taxes 18 18
Three-for-seven fumes 17 14
Vaccine policy 80 83
Mean (SD) 52.5 (24.0)
53.3 
(24.6)
3.49 
(6.57)
3.00 
(5.66)
44.9 
(36.4)
44.9 
(37.4)
Mann-Whitney U 
test
68.0 39.5 179.5
p 0.84 0.80 0.95
SD = standard deviation.
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psychometric evaluation of this instrument, a previous 
study focused only on high-conflict personal dilemmas 
reached a similar reliability (ρ = 0.82), calculated 
through Tarkkonen’s ρ.18
The poor and very low internal consistency found 
for impersonal and low-conflict personal dilemmas was 
consistent along our three experiments (conducted with 
different samples), which reveals their reduced reliability 
in assessing moral decision-making. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have reported the 
internal consistency of these subsets of moral dilemmas, 
but this result was expected. According to Greene et 
al., high-conflict dilemmas share a similar structure, in 
which one person can be harmed to achieve a greater 
benefit.1 Conversely, impersonal and low-conflict moral 
dilemmas have different structures and involve no clear 
conflict between utilitarian and non-utilitarian moral 
principles. Thus, recent studies have focused only on 
high-conflict dilemmas.18 However, impersonal and 
low-conflict dilemmas can also be used as “fillers” to 
mix in with high-conflict dilemmas and to test whether 
participants are responding by chance. Alternatively, as 
dilemmas can be modified to involve different grades of 
conflict, these scenarios can be adapted to increase this 
low internal consistency.2 
Concerning Experiment 2, the adapted version of the 
moral dilemmas with a new way of questioning did not 
reveal significant differences in the responses to each 
category of dilemmas. However, the results revealed a 
lower percentage of utilitarian responses to the modified 
questions. In the case of personal dilemmas, this 
reduction was consistent across all scenarios, except 
one, and the lack of significant statistical differences 
may be due to lack of statistical power, which is a 
limitation of the present study. A future high-powered 
replication study may help resolve this question. 
As the question “Is it appropriate...?” may downplay 
the moral relevance of the scenarios22 and was reported 
as ambiguous, we adopted the new way of questioning 
in Experiment 3, in which a shorter version of the 
moral dilemmas was proposed, aiming to decrease the 
cognitive load by reducing the details of each moral 
scenario.28 This methodological modification attained 
successful results: equivalent internal consistency 
for both versions of the dilemmas, no significant 
differences between the responses elicited, and robust 
associations between both personal and impersonal 
scenarios. Importantly, the aim of Experiment 3 was to 
test the convergent validity of the short version of moral 
dilemmas, to guarantee that the moral content of each 
scenario was preserved despite a reduction of length. 
According to this purpose, a within-subjects design was 
adopted, which does not allow to make substantive 
claims about moral judgment based on the data. They 
are only informative of the convergent validity of the 
short version of moral dilemmas.
The present study has some limitations that 
may be addressed in further investigations. First, 
the questionnaire was applied online, limiting the 
control of experimental settings and confounding 
variables. Furthermore, we did not include a measure 
of socioeconomic status, which may influence moral 
judgments. Also, the study included a sample with a high 
educational level, limiting generalization to different 
educational levels. Finally, we argue that our short 
version may reduce the cognitive load of each scenario, 
but this hypothesis was not directly assessed. 
Furthermore, other characteristics of moral scenarios 
should be tested, such as instructions, presentation 
format, similar word counting between dilemmas, and 
order of presentation, among others.3 Control of these 
aspects will contribute to increase the methodological 
homogeneity of this instrument and its application.
In conclusion, we adapted and validated a widely 
used set of moral dilemmas to European Portuguese, 
and we have made it available as Online-Only 
Supplementary Material. This instrument will allow 
research into moral decision-making in Portuguese-
speaking cultures for the first time, in both healthy and 
pathological populations. Moreover, we tested a new way 
of questioning, which is a matter of research concern.3 
This new question formulation was tested for the first 
time, and it intended to decrease the ambiguity of the 
traditional formulation. Finally, we tested a reduced 
version of the moral scenarios, also available as Online-
Only Supplementary Material. This shorter version will 
be faster to apply, will prevent the participants’ fatigue, 
and will decrease the cognitive load of each scenario. 
Importantly, this aim was reached without changing the 
meaning of each scenario. 
This translated version will be particularly useful 
to investigate moral judgments in clinical Portuguese-
speaking populations. Nevertheless, this study did not 
include clinical samples, and the normative values reached 
cannot be used as reference to clinical participants. 
However, as previous findings have evidenced that 
pathologies related to deficits in emotional processing 
and inhibitory control exhibited an abnormal pattern 
of utilitarian moral judgment, further studies must 
extend moral judgment research to pathologies with 
marked deficits in emotional processing and inhibitory 
control, such as personality and major psychiatric 
disorders.11-13 The shorter version of moral dilemmas 
will be particularly useful for simultaneous application 
with other research techniques that require fast events, 
such as event-related designs for studies with EEG or 
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fMRI. These experiments will significantly contribute to 
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying moral 
decision-making.
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